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Abstract
Recent studies have concluded that R&D grants can induce
firms to export and that exporting and innovating can be comple-
mentary activities at the firm level. Yet the trade literature has
paid little attention to the scope of innovation policy as a stimu-
lus to both trade and innovation. To investigate this question we
rely on a general work-horse model of trade and firm heterogene-
ity with firm investments in R&D activities. The multiplicity
of equilibria together with the interplay of innovation and trade
policies uncover novel results. In particular, we show that the
effects of either policy depend on the degree of protectionism in
a country. Therefore, countries can respond differently to the
same policy, and similarly to different policies. In such a context,
different governments may face different degrees of freedom re-
garding how to achieve a given target. This finding leads us to
discuss the issue of policy coordination.
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1 Introduction
All industrialized countries use some measures of innovation policy, like
R&D grants and tax allowances, to sustain their research activity and
economic growth (OECD, 2005). While originally aimed at increasing
the productivity of firms, these measures have also contributed to stim-
ulating the exports of firms (Goerg et al., 2008). When trading is the
conditio sine qua non for innovating, trading and innovating become
complementary activities (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010). The other side of
this complementarity is policy substitution: if innovation policy favors
export initiation by strengthening innovation efforts, it renders trade
policies with the same objective superfluous, and vice versa.
The importance of policy substitution and, more generally, of policy
coordination is underrated in the current models of trade with heteroge-
nous and monopolistically competitive firms. The reason, however, is
not related to the inadequacy of these models for investigating this is-
sue, but rather to their distinct objective. Motivated by trade liberal-
ization in several countries, the models have offered thorough analysis
of the micro effects of these policies, but they have hardly explored the
concomitant role of innovation policy for stimulating both trade and
innovation, which is the focus of this paper.
Once we have clarified the merits of innovation policies relative to
trade policies, we also endeavor to analyze the issue of policy coordina-
tion that inevitably arises when governments have multiple instruments
to achieve similar goals. Policy selection and coordination become rel-
evant only when policy makers face some trade-offs about stimulating
one activity (e.g., innovation), while harming the other (e.g., trade).
Therefore, a model that features export and innovation only as comple-
mentary activities is not adequate for our purpose, but we would ideally
need equilibria without such complementarity. To maintain analytical
tractability, yet have multiple equilibria, we opt for a model with tech-
nology adoption which nests in the class of models that have followed
the seminal work of Montagna (2001) and Melitz (2003).
An advantage of our approach is that this model features three equi-
libria that can encompass the evidence presented in Castellani and Zanfei
(2007), in Lileeva and Trefler (2010), and in Bustos (2011). Each equi-
librium features different implications for the effects of each policy: only
in one of these equilibria are innovation and trade policies substitutes,
while in the other equilibria the ability to promote both innovation and
export is policy-specific, so that tariff cuts and R&D grants can have
different implications. We can rationalize this result by referring to the
status of the marginal innovating firm in each equilibrium. As in Melitz
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(2003), a pro-trade policy will always cause a reallocation of market
share from low to high productivity firms and exit from the market of
the least productive domestic enterprises. Consequently, if the marginal
innovating firm is an exporter, and its profits are increasing, this policy
will also stimulate technology adoption; otherwise, if the marginal in-
novating firm is a shrinking domestic firm, technology adoption will be
discouraged. Because industry productivity growth depends both on the
reallocation of market shares and on increased productivity investments
by firms, the final outcome of a policy is also prospectively different in
each equilibrium.
Since it is the policy space of a country that ultimately determines
the final equilibrium selection, the effects of either policy depend on
the degree of protectionism of a country. Therefore, countries can have
both heterogenous responses to similar policies and similar responses to
heterogenous policies. A tariff cut, for instance, increases the share of
exporting and innovating firms only in liberal countries, but it harms
the share of firms adopting new technologies in protectionist countries.
Likewise, an R&D grant promotes innovation and hurts exporting only
in the most liberal and most protectionist countries, but favors both
activities in the other countries. Therefore, liberal countries undergoing
tariff cuts experience similar effects to more protectionist countries in-
troducing R&D grants. Importantly, these results do not stem from the
assumption of a specific productivity distribution.
It is indisputable that the availability of an array of policies can confer
some degree of freedom on governments as how to pursue a policy ob-
jective, but policy makers also face some trade-offs. Indeed, each instru-
ment sustaining one activity can unfold different “side-effects” in terms
of harming the other activity. We argue that the order in which policies
are implemented can be relevant for mitigating these policy trade-offs.
In this paper we focus on a positive approach. We describe the ef-
fects of various policies and analyze the trade-offs that arise with multiple
instruments and briefly examine their implications for industry produc-
tivity growth. This is a necessary step towards a deep understanding of
the consequences of these policies for society. Given the already com-
plex interaction between these policies we leave a normative approach
to future research.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present our re-
search in the context of the trade literature. We proceed by presenting
our model and deriving the equilibrium in a closed and open economy in
section 3. Section 4 briefly outlines the closed economy. We then analyze
in section 5 the implications of trade and innovation policies in the open
economy and synthesize our results by means of one simple graph, our
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policy space. This graph illustrates our discussion of the issue of pol-
icy coordination in section 6. Before concluding, we briefly present the
macro-implications of our policies on the industry productivity growth.
2 The background
Given the increasing availability of micro-datasets linked to trade statis-
tics, firm-heterogeneity and its effects have been an important part of re-
cent trade research.1 The seminal works of Montagna (2001) and Melitz
(2003) were extended to include process innovation besides product in-
novation. Navas and Sala (2007) and Bustos (2011) consider a firm’s
technology adoption as a form of process innovation, whereas Atkeson
and Burstein (2010) focus on a firm’s R&D’s investments.
In all these models trade liberalization favors process innovation. For
instance, Bustos (2011) and Bas and Ledezma (2010) show that trade
liberalization has induced Argentinian and Chilean exporters to upgrade
their technology. In their review, Greenaway and Kneller (2007) present
further evidence from studies in other countries.
All these models, however, are hardly reconcilable with the evidence
disclosed in Lileeva and Trefler (2010), as they cannot possibly predict
the behavior of some Canadian firms that have both upgraded their
technologies and simultaneously started to export with the creation of
the US-Canada free trade area. Our work shows that the limitation of
these models to encompass these facts rather originates in neglecting a
multiplicity of equilibria.
We consider a simple framework in which firms pay a fixed cost to
introduce a new technology that reduces the marginal cost in a fixed
proportion. Because the reduction in the marginal cost is proportional,
firms will experience heterogeneous innovation gains. While this ap-
proach departs from more complex innovation technologies (Atkeson and
Burstein, 2010; Long et al. 2011), its analytical tractability allows us to
introduce the important issue of policy coordination that arises when a
broad range of instruments are available to policy makers. The discus-
sion of this matter is based on a comparative static analysis of our steady
states. While we can investigate the benefits to policy makers of differ-
ent policy mixes and different sequences of different policies, we cannot
explain the transition dynamic to the steady state that characterizes the
discussion in Costantini and Melitz (2007) of alternative tariff scenarios.
Finally, our model suggests that extending the type of counterfactual
analysis presented in Corcos et al. (2011) to innovation policy scenarios
could be fruitful.
1See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for an extensive review of this literature.
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To present our model in the next section, we build on Navas and Sala
(2007).
3 The model
Preferences
A continuum of households of measure L have preferences described by
a standard C.E.S. utility function,
U =
 ∫
ω∈Ω
[q(ω)]
σ−1
σ dω
 σσ−1 , σ > 1,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and Ω is the set
of available goods.
Technology
The amount of labor required to produce a quantity q(ω) of variety ω is
l(ω) = fD + cq(ω)
where fD is the fixed labor requirement, and c ∈ [0, c] is the firm-specific
marginal labor requirement.
Entry - exit
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the in-
dustry, and prior to entry all firms are identical. To enter the industry,
a firm must make an initial investment, modeled as a fixed cost of entry
fE > 0 measured in labor units, which is thereafter sunk. An entrant
then draws a labor-per-unit-output coefficient c from a known and exoge-
nous distribution with cdf G(c) and density function g(c) on the support
[0, c]. Upon observing this draw, a firm, like in Melitz (2003), may de-
cide to exit or to produce. If the firm does not exit, it bears the fixed
overhead labor costs, fD. Additionally, it can improve on its technology:
by investing fI units of labor, it can adopt a more productive technol-
ogy and produce at a lower cost γc (γ < 1). Ultimately, it is a choice
between a well established ”baseline” technology - characterized by low
implementation costs, normalized to 0, and variable costs of production
c - and an innovative one - featuring lower variable costs (γc), but higher
fixed costs of adoption (fI).
We assume that technological uncertainty and heterogeneity of the
Melitz-type relates to what we have called a ”baseline” technology, re-
flecting that firms have to learn about their market and their produc-
tivity before they can plan to improve it. Having found out about their
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idiosyncratic productivity, all firms face the option of adopting an al-
ternative technology, what we have referred to as the ”innovative” one.
While the fixed cost of implementation is the same for each firm, the
reduction in variable cost is proportional to the firm’s intrinsic marginal
cost. Since the Melitz-type entry leads to productivity heterogeneity, the
option to adopt is differently attractive to firms with different intrinsic
marginal costs. This could be rationalized as some firms being more
successful than others in implementing the new technology (i.e. better
implementation makes new technologies more productive). 2
Finally, as in Melitz (2003), every incumbent faces a constant (across
productivity levels) probability δ in every period of a bad shock that
would force it to exit.
Trade
We shall assume that the economy under study can trade with other
n ≥ 1 symmetric countries. Trade is, however, not free, but involves
both fixed and variable costs: the firm has to ship τ > 1 units of a good
for each unit to arrive at a destination and has to incur a fixed cost fX
during the period in which starts exporting.
The symmetry of countries ensures that factor price equalization
holds, and all countries share the same aggregate variables.
Prices and profits
Given the CES preferences, the demand of each variety ω is
q(ω) =
R
P
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
, (1)
where R ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω is the aggregate total expenditure, and P ≡[ ∫
ω∈Ω
[p(ω)]1−σ dω
] 1
1−σ
is the price index of the economy.
Facing this demand function, a producer of variety ω with labor output
coefficient c charges the price:
p(ω) =
σ
σ − 1wc ≡ pD(c), (2)
where w is the common wage rate, hereafter taken as the numeraire
2”Technology implementation processes” are in the data the main source of site-
to-site variations in the success of the adopter. See Comin and Bart (2007) and
Bikson et al. (1987). Note that in this framework the productivity ratio of two firms
with different intrinsic marginal costs will be constant if both firms adopt the new
technology.
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(w = 1).3
If the firm has opted for the innovative technology, it charges the
lower price, pI(c) = γpD(c). Therefore, the profits that firm type D
(producer with a ”traditional” technology) and firm type I (firm with
innovative technology) make on the domestic market are, respectively,
piD(c) =
rD(c)
σ
− fD = Bc1−σ − fD and (3)
piI(c) =
rI(c)
σ
− fD − δfI = B(γc)1−σ − fD − δfI , (4)
where rs(c) is the revenue of firm type s ∈ {D, I} andB = (1/σ) RP 1−σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
is a constant from the prospective of a single producer.4
It is worth noting that rI(c)/rD(c) > 1/γ, and therefore the income
of the firm increases more than proportionally following the introduction
of process innovations.
The imported products are more expensive than domestically pro-
duced goods due to transportation costs. The effective consumer price
for a variety shipped from abroad by a non-innovating exporter is pX(c) =
τpD(c), and by a firm adopting the innovative technology it is pXI(c) =
γpX(c). Therefore, the profits of an exporter (firm type X) and an
innovator-exporter (firm type XI) earned on the foreign market are,
respectively,
piX(c) = τ
1−σBc1−σ − δfX and (5)
piXI(c) = (γτ)
1−σBc1−σ − δfX , (6)
where δfX is the amortized per-period fixed cost of the overhead fixed
cost fX that firms have to pay to export.
As in Melitz (2003), no firms will ever export without also producing
for its domestic market, and a firm will either export to all n countries in
every period or never export. (5) is therefore the profit from exporting
conditional on being a domestic firm and, likewise, (6) is the profit from
exporting conditional on being a domestic innovator.
3Alternatively, a freely traded homogenous good produced under constant returns
to scale could be introduced as the numeraire good to set the wage to unity in all
countries.
4Given that there is no additional uncertainty or time discounting other than the
exogenous probability of exiting, firms are indifferent between paying the one time
investment cost fI or the per-period amortized cost δfI .
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4 Equilibrium in a closed economy
The equilibrium entry cost cutoff c0 and innovation cost cutoff cI must
satisfy:
piD(c0) = 0⇐⇒ B (c0)1−σ = fD (7)
piI(cI) = piD(cI)⇐⇒ (γ1−σ − 1)B (cI)1−σ = δfI . (8)
To close the model and determine the two equilibrium cost cutoffs c0
and cI , as well as B and the number of incumbent firms M , free entry
into the market and a stability condition are imposed additionally. Free
entry (henceforth FE) ensures that firms equate the per-period expected
profit from entry to the equivalent amortized per-period entry cost,
δfE =
cI∫
0
piI(c)dG(c) +
c0∫
cI
piD(c)dG(c).
The stationary-equilibrium condition,
MeG(c0) = δM,
requires the aggregate variables to remain constant over time, as the
mass of successful entrants, MeG(c0), exactly replaces the mass, δM , of
incumbents who are hit by the bad shock and exit.
Combining (7) with (8), we have the relation between the innovation
and the entry cutoff
(cI)
1−σ =
δfI
γ1−σ − 1
1
fD
(c0)
1−σ = Ψ (c0)
1−σ , (9)
where δfI
γ1−σ−1 is the cost-to-benefit ratio of innovation. It follows that a
necessary and sufficient condition for having selection into the innovation
status is Ψ > 1, which is assumed to hold throughout since the empirical
evidence suggests that only a subset of more productive firms undertakes
process innovations.5
Finally, we note that the entry productivity cutoff level is higher in
our economy than in Melitz (2003).6 The possibility to innovate allows
the most efficient firms that perform process innovation to ”steal” market
share from the least efficient firms for which it is harder to survive in
5See for instance Parisi et al. (2006) for evidence on Italian firms and Baldwin et
al. (2004) for evidence on Canada.
6The proof of this result has been left to an online appendix.
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the market. Consequently, our economy is more efficient, because some
varieties are produced at a lower cost, but less varied because some
varieties have disappeared. This trade-off has been well emphasized in
the growth literature (see Peretto, 1999) and more recently Gustafsson
and Segerstrom, 2010).
5 The open economy
To differentiate the entry cutoff and the innovation cutoff from the ones
in the closed economy, we denote them in the open equilibrium by cf0
and cfI , respectively.
Guided by her empirical results, Bustos (2011) focuses only on one
possible selection, namely cfI < cX < c
f
0 , so that the marginal innovating
firm is an exporter and responds to tariff cuts with the adoption of a
better technology. We label this kind of selection equilibrium BW to
point to the fact that the growth of the industry productivity has two
sources. One, as in Melitz (2003), comes from the reallocation of market
shares from low to high productivity firms induced by the selection effect
of trade. The second comes from the adoption of better technologies
by firms that trade. In its decomposition of the industry productivity
growth, Bartelsman et al. (2004) refer to the first source as the between
variation and to the the second source as the within variation. The
letters BW (between-within) indicate that in this type of equilibrium
both sources of variation are present.
An equilibrium where both exporters and non-exporters are perform-
ing innovation is also plausible and is consistent with a different type of
selection, namely cX < c
f
I < c
f
0 .
7 In this equilibrium, the marginal in-
novating firm is not an exporter, and therefore it does not respond to
a fall in transportation costs with the adoption of innovative technolo-
gies. We label this selection equilibrium B, as only the between variation
contributes to the growth of the industry aggregate productivity.
As a final case, we scrutinize the limiting case of both these selec-
tions where firms engage either in both activities or neither of them
(cX = c
f
I < c
f
0). In this equilibrium, trade and innovation become com-
plementary activities (henceforth denoted selection C). Interestingly, our
paper shows that the evidence presented in Lileeva and Trefler (2010)
is indeed compatible with the Melitz type model in which there is pro-
cess innovation if one considers the limiting case of two different possible
equilibria.8
In what follows, we analyze each equilibrium separately and investi-
7See Castellani and Zanfei (2007).
8We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this possibility.
9
gate which are the effects of both innovation and trade policies on the
innovation and export activities of firms. We then turn to the issue of
policy coordination.
We consider only stationary equilibria in the sense that all aggregate
variables are constant over time. We therefore impose on each equilib-
rium the stationary condition
δM = MeG(c
f
0), (10)
so that the firms exiting the market are just replaced by the new en-
trants. Although denoted by the same letter as in the closed economy,
the equilibrium values of the aggregate variables Q, R, and B are, in
general, different in this equilibrium as compared to the closed economy
equilibrium.
5.1 Selection BW
We start by determining the equilibrium cost cutoffs for, respectively,
market entry, exporting, and innovating. Given that in equilibrium BW
we have cfI ≤ cX ≤ cf0 , the cost cutoffs must satisfy the following condi-
tions:
piD(c0) = 0⇔ B
(
cf0
)1−σ
= fD (11)
piX(cX) = 0⇔ Bc1−σX =
δfX
τ 1−σ
(12)
piI(c
f
I ) + npiXI(c
f
I ) = piD(c
f
I ) + npiX(c
f
I )⇔ B
(
cfI
)1−σ
=
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ 1−σ) .
(13)
The parameter restriction that sustains this equilibrium and will be
important for our policy analysis below is
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)
1
(1 + nτ 1−σ)
≥ δfXτσ−1 ≥ fD. (14)
The FE condition
cf0∫
cX
piD(c)dG(c)+
cX∫
cfI
(piD(c)+npiX(c))dG(c)+
cfI∫
0
(piI(c)+npiXI(c))dG(c) = δfE
(15)
together with the stationary condition (10) close the model to determine
B and M .
10
To compare the share of firms in the trading equilibrium and in the
autarky equilibrium, it is instructive to write the innovation cutoff as a
function of the entry cut-off,(
cfI
)1−σ
=
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ 1−σ)
1
fD
(
cf0
)1−σ
,
and note that this relation differs from equation (9) only by the term
1/(1+nτ 1−σ). This term is 1 in the closed economy (set n = 0 or τ →∞)
and represents precisely the further revenue differential associated with
innovation for each of the foreign markets that become available with
trade. Although this term is smaller than unity, we cannot conclude
that, for a positive n and a non-prohibitive transportation cost τ , the
share of innovating firms in the trading equilibrium is higher than in
autarky. As we know from Melitz (2003), the selection effect of trade
induces the least productive firms to exit, so that cf0 is lower than in
the closed economy. The overall effect is a priori ambiguous, and we
prove in the appendix that cfI ≥ cI . While this result is common to
Bustos (2011), we show that it is more general because it can be derived
for a general cumulative distribution function of the firm’s productivity
without requiring the Pareto assumption.
Crucial to this result is the selection of firms into exporting activ-
ities. In the absence of the fixed costs of trading (fX = 0), all firms
would export as in Krugman’s (1979) model. With CES preferences,
the increased revenue from increased sales abroad induced by trade op-
portunities would be exactly offset by the loss of domestic revenues due
to increased import competition from foreign varieties. Given that prof-
its would be unchanged, no firms would exit the market. Without exit,
there is no reallocation of market share to exporters. With unchanged
output and market share the incentive to adopt a more efficient technol-
ogy in free trade is also unchanged relative to the autarky equilibrium.
Although not as evident as for τ , fX and fI also have an impact on
the equilibrium cutoffs in a general equilibrium model. We now turn our
attention to the effects that trade policies or innovation policies have on
this economy. A pro-trade policy can consist of a reduction in either
the transportation cost or the regulatory cost of trade (fX). A pro-
innovation policy is in our model a reduction of fI . Although we prove
all results in the appendix, here we limit ourselves to summarizing the
effects of the various policies in table 1, our policy matrix.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
The most striking result is that trade policies have very different
implications for innovation. Only the reduction of the variable trade
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costs can affect both the extensive margin of exporting and innovation
positively. The reduction of fX , on the contrary, contracts the extensive
margin of innovating while increasing the extensive margin of exporting,
and vice versa for a reduction of fI . Therefore, the reduction of the fixed
cost of trade or innovation can just expand the share of firms performing
the related activity at the expense of the share of firms performing the
other activity.
This is because only transportation costs are affecting the variable
profits of all exporting firms. When these costs decline, these enterprises
can further lower prices and increase sales abroad (the intensive margin
adjustment). Because selling internationally has become cheaper, ex-
porting becomes attractive to some domestic firms (higher cX), and be-
cause exporters now face lower variable costs, some of the non-innovator
exporters find it profitable to start innovating (higher cfI ). The increase
in innovation or export either at the intensive or extensive margins raises
labor demand and the real wage. The firms most hurt are the domestic
ones that cannot compensate the increased costs of production with the
expansion of foreign activity. The least productive are therefore forced to
exit (lower cf0), and their market share is redistributed to all incumbent
firms. Overall, like in Melitz (2003), high productivity firms expand,
and low productivity firms shrink.
If the sector-wide productivity is defined as the weighted average of
all firms’ productivity in the industry, with the weights consisting of
the firm’s market share, there are two sources of productivity growth
at the industry level: changes in the firms’ productivity or changes in
the firms’ market share. In Bartelsman et al.’s (2004) terminology, both
the redistribution of market share from low to high productivity firms -
the between-firm effect - and the technology adoption by some exporters
- the within-firm effect - are contributing to the industry productivity
growth in this equilibrium.
5.2 Selection B
In equilibrium B (cX ≤ cfI ≤ cf0) the marginal exporting firm is an
innovator, but the marginal innovator is not an exporter. Consequently,
some domestic firms are innovating. The innovating firms are both the I-
type and the XI-type, but only the latter are present in the international
market. Therefore, piD(c
f
0) = 0, piI(c
f
I ) = piD(c
f
I ) and piXI(cX) = 0 define
our cutoff conditions, and the necessary and sufficient condition for this
equilibrium to hold is
δfXτ
σ−1 ≥ δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)γ
1−σ ≥ γ1−σfD. (16)
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From our policy matrix, we deduce that none of the pro-trade policies
can stimulate innovation in the sense of leading to a higher share of inno-
vating firms in the economy. Since the marginal innovator is a domestic
firm, a reduction of τ or fX has no direct effect on its profit, but it makes
the profits of exporting firms bigger. Higher profits induce these firms to
expand their activity abroad (either at the intensive or extensive mar-
gin), which causes labor demand and real wages to increase. The rise of
production costs affects the non-exporters, including the marginal inno-
vating firm, more severely. Those firms that cannot break even will be
forced out of the market. In the new steady state more domestic firms
will stick to the baseline technology (lower cfI ), and less firms will enter
(lower cf0). Because market share is redistributed from low to high pro-
ductivity firms and some firms give up technology adoption, it is clear
that industry productivity can grow only because of the between-firm
component.
Note, however, that in our model technology adoption occurs only at
the extensive margin because of the exogeneity of γ. With an endogenous
γ and a convex cost of innovation, some of the XIfirms, those that
expand their activity abroad and enlarge their market shares, would find
it optimal in this equilibrium to choose a lower γ and, therefore, promote
technology adoption at the intensive margin, too (see Vannoorenberghe,
2008).
It is instructive to graph the policy space which sustains these two
equilibria. We represent each term of the inequalities (14) and (16) in
figure 1 along with an index of variable trade costs (τσ−1). In the graph
we omit the term γ1−σfD as it is irrelevant for equilibrium B provided it
lies below the curves δfXτ
σ−1 and δfI/(γ1−σ − 1). Condition (14) holds
in the region labeled with BW for transportation costs below τσ−1BW and
if n not too large. Likewise, condition (16) is satisfied in the region la-
beled with B for transportation costs above τσ−1B . Therefore, these two
equilibria are not contiguous in this policy space, and no equilibrium
would be defined for intermediate value of τ . Note that the size of this
middle region crucially depend on the magnitudes of the fixed costs of
trading and innovating as well as on the number of trading partners.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Intuitively, this situation is only compatible with the existence in
equilibrium BW or B of a profitable deviation from the optimal cho-
sen strategy when transportation costs are in this intermediate range.
And this new strategy also has to be different from the strategies the
firm could implement in the other equilibrium. The restriction that
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equilibrium BW imposes is that some firms should be exporting with-
out innovating. However, as transportation costs increase beyond τσ−1BW ,
some firms find this situation suboptimal, but they cannot yet justify
being a domestic innovator until transportation costs have increased at
least to τσ−1B . Likewise, the restriction that equilibrium B imposes is
that some firms innovate without exporting. As transportation costs
decrease below τσ−1B , they cannot any longer justify being innovators
without exporting. This intuition points towards the Lileeva and Trefler
(2010) equilibrium where innovation and exporting are complementary
activities sustaining each other.
To develop the intuition, consider a domestic firm willing to both
export and adopt the innovative technology. Such a strategy is wise if
[npiXI(c)+piI(c)]−piD(c) = [npiXI(c)+piI(c)−npiX(c)+piD(c)]+npiX(c) ≥ 0,
where the first equation is the profit differential from implementing both
options at the same time compared to the profit earned on the domes-
tic market. Note that for a firm with c ≤ cX in equilibrium B, the
first equation is necessarily positive as npiXI and piI − piD are positive.
Likewise, for a firm with c ≤ cI in equilibrium BW this condition holds
as the squared bracket and the last addend in the second equation are
both positive. This is not surprising as we know that this kind of firm
performs both activities in each equilibrium, respectively. Yet this con-
dition could more generally hold in either equilibrium for other firms too,
although all terms may not necessarily be positive. Indeed, a domestic
firm would want to pursue a complementary strategy if the double op-
tion is also more profitable than just either exporting or innovating, so
if
npiXI(c) + piI(c)− piD(c) ≥ npiX(c) + piD(c)− piD(c) (17)
and
npiXI(c) + piI(c)− piD(c) ≥ piI(c)− piD(c). (18)
Equation (17) implies Bc1−σ ≥ δfI
γ1−σ−1
1
1+nτ1−σ , which evaluated at
the marginal exporting firm with c = cX in equilibrium BW translates
into δfXτ
σ−1 ≥ δfI
γ1−σ−1
1
1+nτ1−σ . For this parameter range the marginal
exporting firm finds in the double option a profitable deviation. So will
all other firms with higher productivity too.
Equation (18) implies Bc1−σ ≥ δfXγσ−1τσ−1, or for the marginal inno-
vating firm at c = cfI in equilibrium B,
δfI(τγ)
1−σ
γ1−σ−1 ≥ δfX . Under these
circumstances, the marginal innovating firm finds the double option more
profitable, and so will all other firms with higher productivity.
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Therefore, only when transportation costs are sufficiently low - below
τσ−1BW - some firms find exporting to be more profitable than undertak-
ing both investments simultaneously. Likewise, only for relatively high
transportation costs - above τσ−1B - some firms innovate exclusively for
the domestic market without seeking participation in foreign markets.
In the intermediate range of transportation costs, when converging to
this limiting zone from BW , no firms would ever export without inno-
vating and would ever innovate without exporting like in B. Likewise,
when converging to this limiting zone from B, one does not fall straight
into BW , as no firm would ever export without innovating.
We consider next the equilibrium where this double strategy or com-
plementary strategy between innovating and exporting is optimal.
5.3 Export and Innovate: complementary activities (selec-
tion C )
The innovator and the exporter types coincide (cX = c
f
I ) because ex-
porting and innovating are complementary activities.9 Rearranging (14)
and (16), the parameter space that is complementary to both equilibria
BW and B can conveniently be expressed as
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)
1
(1 + nτ 1−σ)
≤ δfXτσ−1 ≤ δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)γ
1−σ.
We prove in the appendix that only under this parameter restriction
can the strategy of innovating and exporting simultaneously be optimal.
We are mainly concerned with the representation of this condition in
figure 1. Not surprisingly, being the limiting case of both BW and B,
this condition is defined for transportation costs between the two other
equilibria. We label this region between τσ−1BW and τ
σ−1
B with the letter
C.
The boundary of this region clearly still depends on the relative sizes
of fX and fI . But looking at the policy matrix, table 1, we note that
because the activity of exporting and innovating are complementary, ev-
ery pro-trade policy in this equilibrium is also a pro-innovation policy,
and vice versa every pro-innovation policy is a pro-trade policy, too. In
other words, innovation and trade policies become substitutes, and this
feature sets this equilibrium apart from the other two.
9We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this limiting case out to us as the
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) equilibrium.
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6 The Policy Space
Figure 1 proves to be particularly useful for a discussion of the effects of
various policies and, especially, the issue of policy coordination.
Each country’s combination of trade policy (a given τ , and a given
fX) and innovation policy (a given fI), together with the other parame-
ters of the model, jointly select the equilibrium (BW , B, or C) in which
each country will fall. In this sense, we refer to this figure as the coun-
try’s policy space.
Since the fixed costs of trade and innovation determine firms’ selec-
tion into the different activities, they also delineate the boundary of each
equilibrium in this space and trace out the relative size of each region.
But it is the country’s level of trade costs that determines the region into
which each country falls and the effects of trade and innovation policies.
Furthermore, each type of policy instrument has potentially different
effects. Changes to the regulatory costs of trade (fX) and innovation
(fI) affect both the boundaries of the three regions in figure 1 and the
innovation and exporting cost cut-offs as summarized in table 1. But a
change in transportation costs can affect only the cost cutoffs.
The clear implication is that a given policy can impact the economy
of each country differently because its effects depend on the level of
current protection. For example, a reduction of tariff lines could foster
both trade and innovation in countries with low initial tariffs (region
BW ), but depress innovation in other countries with higher tariff levels
(region B). This is because the extensive margin of innovation (cfI )
reacts positively in the first case and negatively in the second case (see
table 1).10 Likewise, an innovation policy can be pro-trade, in the sense
of enlarging the share of exporting firms, only for intermediate levels
of trade protection (region C). In high or low trade cost situations,
respectively region BW and B, an innovation policy deters some firms
from selling internationally (lower cX).
Moreover, for a country located in region BW at the boundary with
region C, a reduction of fI has the effect of shrinking region BW in
favor of region C as τσ−1BW shifts to the left. This change, if sufficiently
large, may push the country into region C given its tariff level. This
policy would then cease to depress the exporting activity (lower cX) as
it would in region BW , but would become pro-trade (higher cX) in the
new steady state.
It is apparent from table 1 that in equilibrium C policy makers have
10Depressing innovation in this context means that the share of innovating firms in
the economy shrinks. Likewise, fostering trade in this context means that the share
of exporting firms expands.
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a higher degree of freedom as both innovation and trade policies sus-
tain each other in increasing the share of firms that export and innovate
in the economy. In the other two equilibria, policy makers face some
trade-offs about sustaining innovation or export. The only exception is
the reduction of transport costs in equilibrium BW . That is the only
instrument capable of increasing both the share of exporting firms and
the share of innovating firms in the economy. All other types of instru-
ments increase the share of firms performing one activity, but reduce the
share of firms performing the other activity. In this sense, the “policy
space” in equilibrium C becomes “larger” than in the other two equi-
libria. The other side of the coin is that “policy coordination” becomes
more valuable in equilibrium BW and a necessity in equilibrium B.
To show the need for policy coordination, consider in figure 1 a coun-
try in region B at the border with region C. As discussed above, this
country always faces the policy dilemma of choosing between sustaining
innovation or trade. If it uses a pro-trade policy, it depresses innovation,
and if it uses a pro innovation policy, it curtails export. If the policy-
target were to incentivize more firms to adopt the more productive tech-
nology, the only means to achieve it would be through a reduction of
fI . This policy also has a second effect: for a given tariff level, it pushes
the country further into region B as the boundary of region B expands
at the expense of region C. Recurring repeatedly this type of policy in
these circumstances therefore has a lock-in effect, as the border of region
C is pushed further to the left. Each attempt of increasing the share of
innovating firms would result in side effects in terms of a smaller share
of exporting firms. Unfortunately, counterbalancing this effect with the
subsequent use of trade policy would not yield the desired effect either,
but would only nullify the effects obtained with the innovation policy.11
The graph suggests that a different strategy centered on a different pol-
icy mix could prove to be more beneficial in this circumstance. Reducing
either the tariff or the regulatory costs of trade would tend to push this
country toward region C. The reduction of trade costs τ would make the
country slide toward that equilibrium, while the reduction of fX shrinks
region B in favor of region C. And in this equilibrium these policies
would also be pro-innovation. Furthermore, innovation policies would
not entail the side cost of depressing exporting activities.
The lock-in effect described above is not a prerogative of equilibrium
B, and under different circumstances it can occur in equilibrium BW ,
too. Consider a country in figure 1 within region BW toward its left
11Note that we cannot here discuss the effects of using innovation and trade policies
simultaneously. Table 1 indeed summarizes only the partial derivatives, not the cross-
derivatives.
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boundary. Such a country has exhausted its possibility to resort to tariff
cuts to sustain both trade and innovation, as it is already in a free trade
situation. Without the tariff instrument at its disposal, it is therefore
trapped in a policy dilemma about sustaining innovation (lower fI) or
exporting (lower fX). And using the two policies sequentially is only
detrimental as they tend to cancel each other out.
If instead this country were at the other extreme of the same equi-
librium, bordering on region C, it would not face any policy trade-offs.
Tariff cuts could indeed be used to increase both the proportion of firms
that adopt new technologies and the proportion of firms that export.
But if this country were to pursue this policy repeatedly, it would slide
toward the low end of this region and progressively exhaust its degrees
of freedom. Starting with a different policy mix can be more beneficial,
especially when the intended purpose of the policy is to raise produc-
tivity investments in the economy. By lowering fI the country may find
itself in region C as this region expands and region BW contracts. And
in the steady state of this equilibrium pro-innovation policies are also
pro-trade policies, and vice versa.
In conclusion, the graph clearly shows two results. First, the bound-
aries and the size of each region potentially differ from country to coun-
try as they respond to the regulatory costs of trade and innovation.
For this fact alone, countries with similar levels of transport costs may
find themselves in different equilibria. Second, depending on the current
level of trade costs, the effects of these policy mixes are potentially dif-
ferent. Interestingly, putting both these results together, it is possible
to reach two apparently antithetic conclusions: the same tariff cut may
impact countries with similar levels of tariff protection differently and
countries with different levels of tariff protection similarly. Indeed, think
in our figure 1 of two countries having different boundaries delineating
each equilibrium and the same level of transportation costs. It is then
possible that they fall into two different regions and face heterogenous
responses to the same policy. Likewise, it is possible that two countries
with different transportation costs and different region boundaries fall
in the same equilibrium and have identical responses to the same policy.
Moreover, when policy makers can resort to multiple instruments,
the choice they make in the first place affects the effectiveness of future
policy options and their degree of freedom. In the examples above,
some type of policies may lock countries into a policy dilemma that
could be avoided with other measures (which we have referred to above
as “policy mixes”). In this sense, the model justifies the recent OECD
emphasis on the desirability of coordination among trade and innovation
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policies.12 But it also stresses that the level of coordination needed is
heterogenous and depends upon the level of trade costs. The graph and
the discussion above suggest that in low trade-cost situations innovation
policies, eventually followed by trade policies, are beneficial to avoid
“policy traps”. In high trade-cost situations, the opposite order, namely
trade policies first and then innovation policies, is a more appropriate
policy mix to avoid policy dilemmas. Finally, with an intermediate level
of trade costs, coordination is not stringent.
A further element of consideration for policy makers is the ease with
which a policy can be adopted. Institutional arrangements may restrict
the range of possibilities available to policy makers, making some pol-
icy mixes less attractive or viable than theoretically conceivable. For
instance, it can be argued that for most European countries changes to
innovation policies are institutionally easier than changes to trade poli-
cies. Provided they comply with European laws, innovation policies are
largely a national matter, whereas changes in trade policies fall under
the European competence and, possibly, the WTO. Return briefly to
the example of our country in region B in figure 1 at the border with
region C. We have argued that pursuing trade policies in the first place
was desirable, but it may be not feasible or more difficult than pursuing
innovation policies because of the institutional context.
These results are based on a comparative static analysis between
three different steady states and three different policies considered one at
the time. It is undeniable that analyzing multiple policy scenarios and/or
characterizing the transitional dynamic between different states should
become a prerogative for future research on the comparative analysis of
different policy mixes across countries.
7 Trade and the moments of the productivity distribution
The redistribution of market share from exiting firms to incumbent firms
(the “between” component) contributes to increase the average produc-
tivity in the industry. Indeed, to a higher cf0 corresponds a higher trun-
cation point of the lower tail of the productivity distribution G(·) and
therefore a higher mean. But whether the average productivity will
increase also depends on the “within” component. Only when a higher
share of firms adopts the innovative technology can the first moment ad-
mittedly increase. This is a different prediction from the Melitz’s (2003)
model where the “within” effect is absent and trade unambiguously in-
creases the average productivity. Likewise, the prediction of our model
for the second moment of the distribution differs from Melitz (2003).
While in the latter a higher productivity truncation point associated
12See Onodera (2008) for a recent OECD discussion.
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with trade necessarily translates into a lower variance of the produc-
tivity distribution, in our model this effect is counterbalanced in some
equilibria by the within-firm effect. Firms introducing the new technolo-
gies indeed contribute to widening the variance of the distribution.
This means that the different policies we have analyzed will also
have different effects on the moments of the productivity distribution,
and these effects will depend on the current “mix” of policies adopted.
8 Conclusion
To study the effects of innovation and trade policies on the share of ex-
porting and innovating firms, we include the option of technology adop-
tion in a workhorse trade model with firm heterogeneity. Leaving aside
any discussion of whether the notion of productivity-enhancing invest-
ment is the same thing as innovation, we explore the richness of this
model, and show that it has multiple equilibria. This multiplicity is
clearly an asset. Not only can it unify within one paradigm several em-
pirical findings, but it has novel implications for the effects of both trade
and innovation policies.
In particular, we show that the same policy does not need to produce
equal effects in all countries. Because the effects of a policy depend on
the current level of protection, countries can respond differently to the
same policy and similarly to different policies. Therefore, a tariff cut is
beneficial to innovation in liberal countries, but harmful to innovation in
protectionist countries. Likewise, both tariff cuts and R&D grants can
promote innovation in countries with different tariff levels.
When policy makers have an array of instruments, there are multiple
ways to pursue a given policy objective, but each way entails different
effects and therefore different side effects. For instance, a liberal country
could promote innovation by means of tariff cuts or R&D grants, but
the two instruments have opposite implications for the share of exporting
firms. In this sense, policy makers face policy trade-offs, and we have
argued that policy coordination becomes essential in mitigating them.
This paper could be extended in several directions. One could con-
sider what the effects of these policies are when they are costly to im-
plement. In this simple exercise we have followed a standard in the lit-
erature, in which we consider that reducing trade barriers or innovation
barriers is costless. However, we must recognize that in some cases, to
implement these policies, society may need to dedicate a non-negligible
amount of resources. Another interesting extension could consider what
the welfare implications of different policy mixes in different equilibria
are. We consider these issues relevant for a future research agenda.
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Appendix
In this section we focus only on the (more relevant) open economy sce-
nario.
.1 Appendix A - Definitions
For deriving the aggregate properties of the model, the cost distribu-
tions should be defined for each type of equilibria, since innovators and
exporters price differently than domestic firms and the sorting process
changes with each type of equilibria.
Equilibrium BW
Cost distributions and productivity indexes
Let µD(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cf0 )−G(cX)
0
,
cX < c ≤ cf0
otherwise
}
,
µXN(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cX)−G(cfI )
0
,
cfI < c ≤ cX
otherwise
}
,
µI(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cfI )
0
,
0 ≤ c ≤ cfI
otherwise
}
denote the cost distributions in each subgroup prior to innovation.
Let
(
c˜D
f
)1−σ
=
cf0∫
cX
c1−σµD(c)dc,
(
c˜I
f
)1−σ
=
cfI∫
0
c1−σµI(c)dc and c˜XN
1−σ =
cX∫
cfI
c1−σµXN(c)dc be the respective average productivities for domestic
firms, innovators, and exporting non-innovators prior to innovation.
Aggregate variables
Analogous to the closed economy version we obtain P 1−σ =
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
M f
(
c˜f
)1−σ
,
where
(
c˜f
)1−σ
= 1
Mf
[
MD
(
c˜D
f
)1−σ
+ (1 + nτ 1−σ)
(
MXN c˜XN
1−σ +MIγ1−σ
(
c˜I
f
)1−σ)]
is again the weighted average productivity index of the economy. As in
the closed economy it can be shown that
R = M fr(c˜f ) = M f r¯f (19)
p¯if =
rf
σ
− fD − G(c
f
I )
G(cf0)
δfI − G(cX)
G(cf0)
nδfX . (20)
The latter equations together with
p¯if =
δfe
G(cf0)
(21)
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and
cX =
(
fD
δfX
) 1
σ−1 cf0
τ
= f(fD, fX , δ, c
f
0 , τ)
and
cfI =
(
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ 1−σ)fD
δfI
) 1
σ−1
cf0 = g(fD, fI , δ, c
f
0 , τ , n, γ) (22)
determine the unique equilibrium. For the latter proofs it is useful to
express the productivity cutoff as
cfI =
(
(γ1−σ − 1)(1 + nτ 1−σ)fX
fI
) 1
σ−1
τcX = h(fX , fI , cX , τ , n, γ)
Equilibrium B
In equilibrium B all exporters are innovators, but not all innovators
are exporters. There is a subset of domestic firms which also innovate.
To derive the aggregate properties of the model, let us define the follow-
ing cost functions:
µD(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cf0 )−G(cfI )
0
,
cfI < c ≤ cf0
otherwise
}
,
µNI(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cfI )−G(cX)
0
,
cX < c ≤ cfI
otherwise
}
,
µX(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cX)
0
,
0 ≤ c ≤ cX
otherwise
}
.
Then we have
P 1−σ =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
M f
(
c˜f
)1−σ
,
where
(
c˜f
)1−σ
= 1
Mf
[
γ1−σMNI c˜NI
1−σ +MD
(
c˜D
f
)1−σ
+ (1 + nτ 1−σ)MXγ1−σ c˜X
1−σ)
]
,
where
(
c˜D
f
)1−σ
=
cf0∫
cfI
c1−σµD(c)dc and c˜NI
1−σ =
cfI∫
cX
c1−σµNI(c)dc. As in
the equilibrium BW equations (19), (20), (21) can be derived. These
together with
cX =
(
fD
δfX
) 1
σ−1 cf0
τγ
= f ∗(fD, fX , δ, c
f
0 , τ , γ)
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and
cfI =
(
(γ1−σ − 1)fD
δfI
) 1
σ−1
cf0 = g
∗(fD, fI , δ, c
f
0 , τ , γ)
determine the unique equilibrium. For latter proofs it is also useful
to express the productivity cutoff as
cfI =
(
(γ1−σ − 1)fX
fI
) 1
σ−1
(τγ) cX = h
∗(fX , fI , cX , τ , γ).
Equilibrium C
In equilibrium Call exporters are innovators, and all innovators are
exporters. The conditional productivity distributions of exporters and
innovators prior to innovation are the same. The expression for the
aggregate price index now becomes:
P 1−σ =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
M f
(
c˜f
)1−σ
,
where
(
c˜f
)1−σ
= 1
Mf
[
MD
(
c˜D
f
)1−σ
+ (1 + nτ 1−σ)
(
MIγ
1−σ
(
c˜I
f
)1−σ)]
,
and the relationships between the export and innovation productivity
cutoffs are given by
cX =
(
δ(fI + nfX)
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1)fD
) 1
1−σ
cf0 = f
∗∗ = g∗∗(fX , fI , c
f
0 , τ , n, γ, fD, δ)
and since cX = cI ⇒ h∗∗ = 1. As in equilibrium BW (19), (20), (21) are
easily derived. For the next propositions we are able to express the ZP
condition in all three equilibria as
fDj0(c
f
0) + nδfXjX(cX) + δfIjI(c
f
I ) = δfE, (23)
where
ji(ci) =
((
c˜i
ci
)1−σ
− 1
)
G(ci), ci = c
f
0 , cX , c
f
I and i = 0, X, I
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and
(
c˜f0
)1−σ
=
cf0∫
0
c1−σµ(c)dc and µ(c) =
{
g(c)
G(cf0 )
0
,
0 ≤ c ≤ cf0
otherwise
}
.
This productivity distribution corresponds to the incumbent productiv-
ity distribution prior to innovation. The ji(ci) functions are continuous.
In the online appendix we show that
j′i(ci) =
(σ−1)
ci
(
c˜i
ci
)1−σ
G(ci) > 0,
and therefore these functions are monotonically increasing in their
respective arguments. We also show that the elasticities are given by:
j′i(ci)
ji(ci)
ci =
(σ − 1)
(
c˜i
ci
)1−σ((
c˜i
ci
)1−σ
− 1
) . (24)
These results will be useful in the following section.
.2 Appendix B - Parameter restriction for equilib-
rium C
In equilibrium C, firms consider the joint option of exporting and inno-
vating. According to what is derived in section 3.3, no firm will innovate
without being an exporter, and no firm will export without being an
innovator. The firm evaluates whether to export and innovate is better
than not doing both and remain local. The partition in this equilibrium
is between exporting and innovating firms, and local firms. Let us call
cI w.l.o.g. the marginal cost associated with the firm which is indifferent
between both options.
Then this marginal firm will satisfy the following condition:
(1 +nτ 1−σ)γ1−σB
(
cfI
)1−σ
− δ(fI +nfX)− fD−
(
B
(
cfI
)1−σ
− fD
)
= 0
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1)B
(
cfI
)1−σ
= δ(fI + nfX).
The marginal firm being indifferent between staying in the market
or not satisfies
Bc1−σ0 = fD.
Then a necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is that(
cfI
c0
)1−σ
> 1⇒ δ(fI + nfX)
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1)fD > 1.
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The previous equation guarantees that not all firms innovate and
export. However, for equilibrium C to exist, the marginal firm must
be indifferent between innovating and exporting or being local. This
implies that the income of the marginal firm in equilibrium C must be
larger than the income of this firm when it innovates, provided that the
firm will be an exporter, or when it exports, provided that the firm will
be an innovator. In other terms:
B
(
cfI
)1−σ
≥ δfI
γ1−σ − 1
1
1 + nτ 1−σ
(25)
B
(
cfI
)1−σ
≥ δfXγσ−1τσ−1. (26)
The marginal firm in equilibrium C has the following income:
B
(
cfI
)1−σ
=
δ(fI + nfX)
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1) . (27)
Substituting (27) in (25), we have
δ(fI + nfX)
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1) ≥
δfI
γ1−σ − 1
1
1 + nτ 1−σ
.
Rearranging terms in the latter equation, we have
δfIγ
1−σ (1 + nτ 1−σ)−δfI (1 + nτ 1−σ)+nδfX (γ1−σ − 1) (1 + nτ 1−σ) ≥ δfIγ1−σ (1 + nτ 1−σ)−δfI .
Rearranging terms, we have
−δfInτ 1−σ + nδfX
(
γ1−σ − 1) (1 + nτ 1−σ) ≥ 0,
and then this implies
δfXτ
σ−1 ≥ δfI
(γ1−σ − 1) (1 + nτ 1−σ) .
This is one of the restrictions needed to be satisfied if equilibrium C
holds.
Now substituting (27) in (26) we have
δ(fI + nfX)
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1) ≥ δfXγ
σ−1τσ−1.
Rearranging terms, we have
δfI + nδfX ≥ δfXτσ−1 + nδfX − δfXγσ−1τσ−1,
27
and this implies
δfI ≥ δfXτσ−1 − δfXγσ−1τσ−1,
which implies
δfI ≥ δfXτσ−1(1− γσ−1).
Multiplying both sides by (τγ)1−σ and rearranging terms, we have
δfI
(γ1−σ − 1)γ
1−σ ≥ τσ−1δfX
which is the other requirement for equilibrium C to hold.
.3 Appendix C - Proof of Propositions.
Proposition 1 (Trade Liberalization: Equilibrium BW): Trade Liber-
alization yields the following results:
1. Tariff policy:
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0, ∂cX
∂τ
< 0,
∂cfI
∂τ
< 0
2. Export regulation costs (fX) :
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0, ∂cX
∂fX
< 0,
∂cfI
∂fX
> 0
Proof. 1. A tariff reduction:
Totally differentiate (23) with respect to τ :
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂τ
+ nδfXj
′
X(cX)
∂cX
∂τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
∂cfI
∂τ
= 0, (28)
where, as described above, cX = f(c
f
0 , τ , fD, fX , δ), c
f
I = g(c
f
0 , τ , fD, fI , n, δ, γ),
cfI = h(cX , fI , τ , fX , n, γ). Applying the chain rule and applying the fol-
lowing results: ∂f
∂cf0
= cX
cf0
, ∂f
∂τ
= − cX
τ
, ∂g
∂cf0
=
cfI
cf0
, ∂g
∂τ
= − c
f
I
τ
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
, we
obtain
∂cf0
∂τ
=
nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
τ
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
cfI
cf0
) > 0.
Taking into consideration that
∂cfI
∂τ
=
∂h
∂cX
∂cX
∂τ
+
∂h
∂τ
in (28) and applying the following results: ∂h
∂cX
=
cfI
cX
∂h
∂τ
= ∂h
∂φ
∂φ
∂τ
=
cfI
τ
1
1+nτ1−σ where φ = τ
1−σ, then:
∂cX
∂τ
=
−
(
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
τ
1
1+nτ1−σ
)
(
nδfXj′X(cX) + δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
cX
) < 0.
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To get the sign of the derivative of
∂cfI
∂τ
we apply the chain rule
∂cfI
∂τ
=
∂g
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂τ
+
∂g
∂τ
.
Then substituting the expressions for ∂g
∂cf0
, ∂g
∂τ
we get
∂cfI
∂τ
=
cfI
cf0
∂cf0
∂τ
− c
f
I
τ
(
nτ 1−σ
1 + nτ 1−σ
)
.
Then showing
∂cfI
∂τ
< 0 implies
∂cf0
∂τ
<
cf0
τ
(
nτ 1−σ
1 + nτ 1−σ
)
.
Substituting the expression for
∂cf0
∂τ
in the previous equation, we obtain
nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
τ
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
cfI
cf0
) < cf0
τ
(
nτ 1−σ
1 + nτ 1−σ
)
.
Manipulating the expression we arrive at the following condition
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
cf0
τ
(
nτ 1−σ
1 + nτ 1−σ
)
− nδfXj′X(cX)
cX
τ
(
1
1 + nτ 1−σ
)
> 0.
Simplifying, we get
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)c
f
0τ
1−σ > δfXj′X(cX)cX
rearranging (
τ 1−σfD
δfX
)
j′0(c
f
0)c
f
0 > j
′
X(cX)cX ,
where the first element is(
cf0
cX
)1−σ
j′0(c
f
0)c
f
0 > j
′
X(cX)cX .
Substituting the expressions j′D(c
f
0), j
′
X(cX), we have that(
c˜f0
)1−σ
G
(
cf0
)
> (c˜X)
1−σ G (cX) ,
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and substituting the expressions
(
c˜f0
)1−σ
, (c˜X)
1−σ, we get
cf0∫
0
c1−σg(c)dc >
cX∫
0
c1−σg(c)dc
since cX < c
f
0 .
2. A decrease in fX :
Totally differentiating (23) with respect to fX , we find that
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂fX
+nδjX (cX) +nδfXj
′
X(cX)
∂cX
∂fX
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
∂cfI
∂fX
= 0. (29)
Again applying the chain rule and the following results: ∂f
∂fX
= −1
σ−1
cX
fX
,
∂h
∂fX
= 1
σ−1
cfI
fX
, ∂g
∂fX
= 0, we have that
∂cf0
∂fX
=
nδ
(
j′X(cX)
cX
σ−1 − jX (cX)
)(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
cfI
cf0
) > 0.
The latter is positive. To see this, notice that the numerator is positive
iff
j′X(cX)
jX(cX)
cX > σ − 1. (30)
Using (24) in (30): (
c˜X
cX
)1−σ
>
((
c˜X
cX
)1−σ
− 1
)
,
which is always satisfied.
To get the sign of ∂cX
∂fX
, we use (29) and the fact that
∂cfI
∂fX
=
∂h
∂cX
∂cX
∂fX
+
∂h
∂fX
to obtain
∂cX
∂fX
=
−
(
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂fX
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
1
σ−1
cfI
fX
+ nδjX(cX)
)
(
nδfXj′X(cX) + δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
cX
) < 0.
Note that from the chain rule we can derive
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∂cfI
∂fX
=
∂g
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fX
+
∂g
∂fX
> 0.
Proposition 2 Trade Liberalization (Equilibrium B) : Trade Liberal-
ization experiments in this equilibrium yields the following results:
1. Tariff policy:
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0, ∂cX
∂τ
< 0,
∂cfI
∂τ
> 0
2. Export regulation costs (fX) :
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0, ∂cX
∂fX
< 0,
∂cfI
∂fX
> 0
Proof. The Proof follows the same scheme as the previous proof. How-
ever, we know that now the equations determining the cutoffs have
changed and then we have that
cX = f
∗(cf0 , τ , fX , δ), c
f
I = g
∗(cf0 , τ , fI , δ, γ, fD), c
f
I = h
∗(cX , τ , fX , fI , γ).
1. Tariff policy:
Applying the chain rule and using (28) and the following results:
∂f∗
∂τ
= −cX
τ
∂f∗
∂cf0
= cX
cf0
∂g∗
∂τ
= 0 ∂g
∗
∂cf0
=
cfI
cf0
, we obtain
∂cf0
∂τ
=
nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
τ(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
cfI
cf0
) > 0.
Applying the chain rule in (28) and using ∂f
∗
∂τ
= −cX
τ
∂f∗
∂cf0
= cX
cf0
, we
obtain
∂cX
∂τ
=
−
(
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
cf0
τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
τ
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0)
cf0
cX
+ nδfXj′X(cX) + δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
cfI
cX
) < 0
and for the innovation cutoff we just apply the chain rule:
∂cfI
∂τ
=
∂g∗
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂τ
+
∂g∗
∂τ
> 0,
but we know that: ∂g
∗
∂τ
= 0 and ∂g
∗
∂cf0
> 0,
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0. So
∂cfI
∂τ
> 0.
2. Export regulation costs:
Notice that ∂f
∗
∂fX
= −1
σ−1
cX
fX
, ∂h
∗
∂fX
= 1
σ−1
cfI
fX
, ∂g
∗
∂fX
= 0, and ∂f
∗
∂cf0
=
cX
cf0
, ∂g
∗
∂cf0
=
cfI
cf0
, ∂h
∗
∂cf0
=
cfI
cX
. Since j′i(ci) > 0 ∀i = 0, X, I and ci = cf0 , cX , cfI .
The partial derivatives mentioned above are the same in both equilibria
BW and B; therefore the same proof applies.
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Proposition 3 (Trade Liberalization. Equilibrium C): Trade Liberal-
ization experiments in this equilibrium yield the following results:
1. Tariff policy:
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0, ∂cX
∂τ
< 0,
∂cfI
∂τ
< 0
2. Export regulation costs (fX) :
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0, ∂cX
∂fX
< 0,
∂cfI
∂fX
< 0
Proof. The proof is analogous to the other type of equilibria. It is
important to remember however that in this equilibrium: cfI = cX ⇒
c˜fI = c˜X ⇒ jX(cX) = jI(cfI ). Also cX = f ∗∗(cf0 , τ , fX , fD, n, δ, γ, fI), cfI =
g∗∗(cf0 , τ , fX , fD, n, δ, γ, fI), c
f
I = h
∗∗(cX), where f ∗∗(c
f
0 , τ , fX , fD, n, δ, γ, fI) =
g∗∗(cf0 , τ , fX , fD, n, δ, γ, fI). Then c
f
I = h
∗∗(cX) = cX .
1. Tariff policy:
Totally differentiating (23) we get
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂τ
+ nδfXj
′
X(cX)
∂cX
∂τ
+ δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
∂cfI
∂τ
= 0.
Applying the chain rule and the following results, ∂f
∗∗
∂τ
= ∂g
∗∗
∂τ
=
−cX
τ
(
nτ1−σγ1−σ
((1+nτ1−σ)γ1−σ−1)
)
∂f∗∗
∂cf0
= ∂g
∗∗
∂cf0
= cX
cf0
, we arrive at the follow-
ing result:
∂cf0
∂τ
=
δ(fI + nfX)j
′
X(cX)
cX
τ
(
nτ1−σγ1−σ
((1+nτ1−σ)γ1−σ−1)
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + δ(fI + nfX)j
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
) > 0.
Remember that in this equilibrium
∂cfI
∂τ
= ∂cX
∂τ
. To obtain the sign of this
derivative, we first apply the chain rule to get
∂cX
∂τ
=
∂f ∗∗
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂τ
+
∂f ∗∗
∂τ
.
Substituting
∂cf0
∂τ
into the previous expression, we get
∂cX
∂τ
=
δ(nfX+fI)j
′
X(cX)
cX
τ
(
nτ1−σγ1−σ
((1+nτ1−σ)γ1−σ−1)
)
(
fDj
′
0(c
f
0 )
c
f
0
cX
+δ(fI+nfX)j
′
X(cX)
) − cX
τ
(
nτ1−σγ1−σ
((1+nτ1−σ)γ1−σ−1)
)
.
Rearranging terms it can be shown that this expression is negative
whenever the following holds:
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
cf0
τ
(
nτ 1−σγ1−σ
((1 + nτ 1−σ)γ1−σ − 1)
)
> 0.
2. Export regulation costs:
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Note that
∂f ∗∗
∂fX
=
−cX
σ − 1
(
n
fI + nfX
)
.
Then totally differentiating and applying the latter results yields the
following expression:
∂cf0
∂fX
=
δ(fI + nfX)j
′
X(cX)
cX
σ−1
(
n
(fI+nfX)
)
− nδjX(cX)(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + δ(fI + nfX)j
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
) > 0.
Note that the sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of the
numerator. Simplifying we obtain
j′X(cX)cX
jX(cX)
> σ − 1,
which clearly holds as we have shown in previous sections.
To get the sign for ∂cX
∂fX
=
∂cfI
∂fX
, we totally differentiate expression (23)
and we apply ∂h
∂cX
= 0. Then we obtain
∂cX
∂fX
=
−
(
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂fX
+ nδjX(cX)
)
δ(fI + nfX)j′X(cX)
< 0
since
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0.
Proposition 4 (Innovation policies). A reduction in the costs of in-
novation reduces the export cutoff(cX) and the domestic cutoff (cX). It
increases the innovation cutoff
(
cfI
)
.
Proof. Equilibrium BW
We show that
∂cf0
∂fI
> 0, ∂cX
∂fI
> 0,
∂cfI
∂fI
< 0.
Differentiating (23) with respect to fI we get
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂fI
+ nδfXj
′
X(cX)
∂cX
∂fI
+ δjI(c
f
I ) + δfIj
′
I(c
f
I )
∂cfI
∂fI
= 0.
Totally differentiating the previous conditions, we have
∂cX
∂fI
=
∂f
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fI
+
∂f
∂fI
∂cfI
∂fI
=
∂g
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fI
+
∂g
∂fI
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and also applying the following results: ∂f
∂fI
= 0, ∂g
∂fI
= 1
1−σ
cfI
fI
∂cfI
∂fI
=
δ
(
j′I(c
f
I )c
f
I
σ−1 − jI(cfI )
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0) + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
cfI
cf0
) . (31)
This condition is positive provided that
j′I(c
f
I )c
f
I
σ − 1 − jI(c
f
I ) > 0.
Rearranging terms and using (24), for the latter expression to be positive
the following must hold:(
c˜fI
cfI
)1−σ
>
( c˜fI
cfI
)1−σ
− 1
 ,
which obviously holds. Moreover, since
∂cX
∂fI
=
∂f
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fI
+
∂f
∂fI
we then have ∂cX
∂fI
> 0, since ∂f
∂fI
= 0. To get the sign for
∂cfI
∂fI
, we use the
following expression:
∂cfI
∂fI
=
∂g
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fI
+
∂g
∂fI
.
We want to show that
∂cfI
∂fI
< 0. Substituting (31) and rearranging terms,
we arrive at the following expression:
δ
(
j′I(c
f
I )c
f
I
σ−1 − jI(cfI )
)
(
fDj′0(c
f
0)
cf0
cfI
+ nδfXj′X(cX)
cX
cfI
+ δfIj′I(c
f
I )
) − 1
σ − 1
cfI
fI
< 0.
Rearranging terms we arrive at the following expression:
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
cf0
(σ − 1) fI + nδfXj
′
X(cX)
cX
(σ − 1) fI + δjI(c
f
I ) > 0,
which clearly holds.
Equilibrium B
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Differentiating f ∗, g∗, and h∗ with respect to fI , we get
∂f∗
∂fI
= 0,
∂g∗
∂fI
= 1
1−σ
cfI
fI
. Together with this we have ∂f
∗
∂cf0
= ∂f
∂cf0
, ∂g
∗
∂cf0
= ∂g
∂cf0
. Then the
results are analogous to the ones in equilibrium BW. The proof is also
analogous.
Equilibrium C
Differentiating f ∗∗, g∗∗, and h∗∗ with respect to fI , we get
∂f∗∗
∂fI
=
∂g∗∗
∂fI
= −cX
σ−1
(
1
fI+nfX
)
. Remember that in Equilibrium C jX(cX) = jI(c
f
I ).
Differentiating (23) with respect to fI , we get
fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
∂cf0
∂fI
+ δjX(cX) + δ (fI + nfX) j
′
X(cX)
∂cX
∂fI
= 0.
Applying the chain rule, we have
∂cf0
∂fI
=
δ
(
j′X(cX)cX
(σ−1) − jX(cX)
)
fDj′0(c
f
0) + δ (fI + nfX) j
′
X(cX)
cX
cf0
> 0
since, as previously shown,
j′X(cX)cX
(σ−1) − jX(cX) > 0. To get ∂cX∂fI =
∂cfI
∂fI
, we
apply the chain rule to get
∂cX
∂fI
=
∂f ∗∗
∂cf0
∂cf0
∂fI
+
∂f ∗∗
∂fI
.
Substituting the values for
∂cf0
∂fI
and ∂f
∗∗
∂fI
, we have
∂cX
∂fI
=
δ
(
j′X(cX)cX
(σ−1) − jX(cX)
)
fDj′0(c
f
0)
cf0
cX
+ δ (fI + nfX) j′X(cX)
− cX
σ − 1
(
1
fI + nfX
)
.
Rearranging terms we have
∂cX
∂fI
=
−
(
jX(cX) + fDj
′
0(c
f
0)
cf0
(σ−1)(fI+nfX)
)
fDj′0(c
f
0)
cf0
cX
+ δ (fI + nfX) j′X(cX)
< 0.
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Table 1: The Policy Matrix
BW cf0 cX c
f
I
τ
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0 ∂cX
∂τ
< 0
∂cfI
∂τ
< 0
fX
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0 ∂cX
∂fX
< 0
∂cfI
∂fX
> 0
fI
∂cf0
∂fI
> 0 ∂cX
∂fI
> 0
∂cfI
∂fI
< 0
B cf0 cX c
f
I
τ
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0 ∂cX
∂τ
< 0
∂cfI
∂τ
> 0
fX
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0 ∂cX
∂fX
< 0
∂cfI
∂fX
> 0
fI
∂cf0
∂fI
> 0 ∂cX
∂fI
> 0
∂cfI
∂fI
< 0
C cf0 cX c
f
I
τ
∂cf0
∂τ
> 0 ∂cX
∂τ
< 0
∂cfI
∂τ
< 0
fX
∂cf0
∂fX
> 0 ∂cX
∂fX
< 0
∂cfI
∂fX
< 0
fI
∂cf0
∂fI
> 0 ∂cX
∂fI
< 0
∂cfI
∂fI
< 0
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Figure 1: The Policy Space
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